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Acadia and the Bermudas differed greatly in natural environment and in their human history prior to 
European colonization. Yet this study finds that European expectations of the two colonies were closely comparable 
during the earliest decades of the seventeenth century. During this exceptional period, differences in economic 
and environmental potential were obscured by prevailing assumptions, arising from geographical concepts and 
from the influence of the Spanish colonial example, and by the common effort to reconcile the fundamental coriflict 
between commercial and colonial aims. The resulting similmities of experience between Acadia and the Bennudas 
were short-lived, but genuine. 
L' Acadie et les Bermudes differaient fortement au point de vue du milieu physique et de leur histoire avant 
Ia colonisation europeenne. Cependant Ia presente etude revele que les attentes des Europeens dans les deux 
colonies furent tres comparables lors des premieres decennies du XVII' siecle. Pendant cette periode excep-
tionnelle, les differences des possibilires economiques et physiques furent voilees par les pretentions dominantes 
nees des conceptions geographiques et de l' influence de l' exemple colonial espagnol, et par un meme effort de 
concilier l' oppositionfondamentale entre les objectifs commerciaux et politiques. Les similitudes entre les ex-
periences de l' Acadie et des Bermudes furent breves mais reelles. 
I 
In the rapid development of North American colonial history as a field for vigorous 
scholarly enquiry and debate in recent decades, it has become evident that neither the island 
colonies outside the Caribbean nor the continental colonies of the extreme northeast have 
attracted the interest of historians to the same extent as have the ultimately more populous 
provinces of the French, British, and Spanish empires which were located further west and 
south. Colonies such as Acadia and the Bermudas have by no means lacked altogether for 
modem historical analysis, and yet their place has never been secure in efforts to construct 
syntheses of important phases in the overall colonial experience. 1 While the works of such 
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authors as K. G. Davies and David B. Quinn have comprised rare exceptions to this neglect, 
the more typical pattern can be exemplified in a recent collective reappraisal of Colonial 
British America in which the introduction admits that of the contributing essayists, "no 
one treats in a systematic or sustained way the less populous island colonies of Bermuda, 
the Bahamas, and Newfoundland or the most northern continental colony, Nova Scotia.'' 2 
What is less typical in the latter collection is that the editors, Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole, 
should have noted the omission and suggested an explanation for it. The underemphasis 
upon these colonies, they contend, is partial evidence of "the continuing failure of the 
colonial American historical community to adopt a larger conception of their subject or, 
perhaps, fully to accept the desirability of a nonteleological histoire to tale.'' 3 
Failure to avoid a teleological influence has affected not only the spatial but also the 
temporal preoccupations of colonial historians. It is, of course, a truism that colonial set-
tlement can lead to the development of new societies, whether distinctive in character or 
- as New England community historians have frequently argued in the past two decades 
-having much in common with traditional European societies from which the colonists 
were drawn. 4 The development of such societies is one legitimate object of the colonial 
historian's attention. Yet if histoire totale is to be attempted, attention must be directed 
also at the time period which necessarily preceded the establishment of a continuing colonial 
society: the time of initial adjustment, when early European inhabitants struggled to come 
to terms with the native peoples and natural environment of the Americas, by conquest, 
accommodation, or a combination of the two. Only after that crucial transition could settler 
societies be said to have existed, to have been able to begin in earnest the process of cultural 
transfer and social evolution that would lead in tum to the development of coherent social 
and economic communities. In a historiography that places prime emphasis, however, upon 
coherent communities and their characteristics as the proper study of historians, rigorous 
consideration of the earlier period of transition tends to be excluded. 
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The shortcomings of a teleological approach to early colonial history- concentrating 
only on those colonies which eventually accumulated large, organized populations, and 
on the processes of development which led with seeming inexorability to that end result 
-have long been recognizable to those historians who have looked for them. In the case 
of New England, for example, the tendency to begin serious historical study with the Pil-
grims and Puritans, to the exclusion of earlier colonizing attempts, was attacked more than 
half a century ago by C.K. Bolton. 5 Yet it has remained true that the Plymouth and Mas-
sachusetts Bay societies have claimed a massive and, arguably, a disproportionate share 
of the scholarship devoted to New England in the early decades of the seventeenth century, 
to the virua1 exclusion of the ultimately less successful but more typical endeavours in such 
areas an Casco, Piscatagua, and Wessagusset. In recent years, new perspectives have arisen 
not so much from the study of colonies per se as from treatments of the native experience 
of colonization and of the general phenomenon of European overseas enterprise. Eth-
nohistorical studies of Amerindian societies and of native-European relations have not only 
emphasized the theme of discontinuity by showing the profound disruptions of native society 
caused by European contact, but have also shed light on the mistakes and insecurities of 
colonizers as well as colonized. 6 Studies of European overseas expansion, meanwhile, have 
established that colonization was only one of the possible goals, and not necessarily a 
dominant one even after the turn of the seventeenth century. ''Colonization in the full sense 
of the term," writes Kenneth R. Andrews, "was a concept which attracted much attention 
and discussion before 1630, but in practice it was not central to the development of English 
overseas enterprise and only became one of the leading themes in the Jacobean period. '' 7 
The implications of these insights for the historiography of colonial development, 
however, have not so far been fully realized. Individual colonies might have their "starving 
times'' or other difficulties, but as a general phenomenon the European participation in a 
time period when social disorientation and economic collapse were imminent dangers for 
native and non-native alike, and when the value of North American colonization from a 
European standpoint was accordingly in doubt, has not been widely considered. ''Some 
correction of the usual perspective is necessary here,'' Andrews has argued, ''for history 
always distorts what it describes and modem views of the expansion tend for obvious 
reasons to magnify the importance of North America. " 8 And, as Joyce Appleby has 
5. C. K. Bolton, TheRealFoundersofNewEngland(Boston: F. W. Faxon Co., 1929). 
6. Examples include Olive P. Dickason, The Myth of the Savage: And the Beginnings of French 
Colonialism in the Americas (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984); Cornelius J. Jaenen, Friend and 
Foe: Aspects of French-Amerindian Cultural Contact in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1976); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Settling with the Indians: The Meeting of English 
and Indian Cultures in America, /580-J640(fotowa, N.J.: Rowan and Littlefield, 1980); NealSalisbwy, Manitou 
and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643 (New Y ode and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982); Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered 
(Kingston and Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1985). For a general discussion of trends in native 
history up until 1978, see James Axtell, "The Ethnohistory of Early North America", William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd series, XXXV (1978): ll0-44. 
7. Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade , Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of 
the British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 357. Other discussions of 
the nature and the weaknesses of English overseas expansion in this period can be found in such worlcs as Quinn, 
North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements; K. R. Andrews, N. P. Canny, and P. E. H. Hair, 
The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic and America, 1480-1650 (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1979); and J. C. Appleby, "An Association for the West Indies? English Plans for a West 
India Company, 1621-1626", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XV (May 1987): 213-41. 
8. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, p. 357. 
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warned, "continuity and persistence" have been attributed as unduly "normative quality" 
in the history of the colonies. 9 
To be sure, this is not purely a historiographical problem. Although rarely recognized 
as such by contemporaries, it was also a problem which underlay - in the form of un-
realistic expectations- the many difficulties encountered by colonizing ventures originating 
from the nations of northern Europe in the early seventeenth century. Superficially prepared 
by the example of Spanish and Portuguese imperialism in central and South America, the 
proponents of North American colonization - governments, investors, colonial propa-
gandists- were, in reality, quite unprepared for the struggles that early colonies would 
undergo. The Iberian empires had achieved rapid conquest, and in so doing had gained 
access to precious metals and taken over virtually intact certain facets of native society. 
Social and economic organization of those empires had rapidly begun on a path of con-
tinuous evolution; this pattern of colonial development had also become, through an 
extensive literature, part of the common intellectual property of Europe. Later, the struggles 
which arose from unsuccessful attempts to apply the pattern to other parts of the Americas 
were to become the common property of the colonizing nations of northern Europe: the 
reconciliation of expectation and reality proved to be a laborious task and often a losing 
battle. 
To exemplify the common character of these struggles, through consideration of the 
similarities of expectation and experience which could arise in the early colonizing years 
even between two such diverse colonies as Acadia and the Bermud~. will be one major 
purpose of this essay. In particular, the interaction of European expectation with colonial 
reality was analogous in the two colonies, and generated similar conflicts of interest. The 
essay will also contend that such similarity of experience was characteristic of the transitional 
period prior to the establishment, by conquest or accommodation, of a stable relationship 
between colonial society and the resources and environment of the territories claimed. 
Furthermore, by suggesting a comparison between two colonies which were not to develop · 
into populous communities in the same sense as did their more westerly and southerly 
neighbours, it will be argued that through a nonteleological approach the role of these areas 
in early colonial historiography can be returned to its proper significance. 
II 
It is necessary to begin by establishing that there were dissimilarities between Acadia 
and the Bermudas as areas for European colonization, which apparently present obstacles 
to a comparative treatment despite recent general discussion of the virtues of comparative 
analysis. 10 The most obvious contrast between Acadia and the Bermudas was geographical. 
The Bermudas, consisting of a group of islands with a total surface area of some twenty-
one square miles, were tiny when measured against the extensive mainland and island 
territories of Acadia. Taking only a modest version of the several French claims that were 
made on behalf of Acadia at various times during the seventeenth century, the colony in-
cluded all of what is now known as the Maritime region of Canada as well as coastal lands 
9. Joyce Appleby, "Value and Society", in Greene and Pole, Colonial British America, p. 308. See 
also the comments in James Axtell, "Europeans, Indians and the Age of Discovery in American History Text-
books", American Historical Review, XCII (June 1987): 621-32. 
10. See Raymond Grew, "The Case for Comparing Histories", American Historical Review, LXXXV 
(October 1980): 763-78. 
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as far south-westwards as the Penobscot River in the modem State of Maine. The area of 
Bermuda was almost exactly one-hundredth of the area of the lle St. Jean (later renamed 
Prince Edward Island), which was itself only a small portion of the colony of Acadia. The 
two colonies also contrasted in terms of climate. An early English resident of Bermuda 
wrote in 1612 that he was enjoying "more temperate and better weather than you have in 
England''; already in that year, the consistently warm temperatures and frequent sunshine 
of the Bermudian climate had combined with the commemoration of the role of the colonizer 
Sir George Somers in the development of the islands to produce the designation "Summer 
Islands'' by which the Bermudas were henceforth frequently known to the English. 11 French 
experience in Acadia, despite the high hopes engendered at first by the continentally-in-
fluenced warmth of the summer, caused Samuel de Champlain to present an altogether 
different portrayal: ''il y a six mois d'yver en ce pays.'' 12 
There were also profound differences between Acadia and the Bermudas in the 
human history of the respective territories prior to European colonization. Acadia had a 
substantial native population of Algonkian-speaking peoples, of which the largest- the 
Micmac- may have numbered as many as 35,000 prior to European contact. 13 To be sure, 
the effects of European disease and acculturation had reduced this population considerably 
by the time colonization began in the early seventeenth century, but even this situation 
contrasted with that of Bermuda, where there was no native population at the time of the 
Europeans' arrival. 14 Furthermore, for reasons that were not unconnected with the contrast 
in terms of native populations, Acadia had been much more frequently visited by Europeans 
during the sixteenth century than had Bermuda. The sixteenth century had seen the be-
ginning of a flourishing European fishery off the Atlantic coast of Acadia, as well as in-
termittent fur trading between native people and Europeans. The Bermudas were visited 
by the Spanish navigator Juan Bermudez at least as early as 1515, but quickly acquired 
an unfavourable reputation for treacherous currents and dangerous rocky shoals. Despite 
occasional Spanish colonizing projects which were never put into practice, the islands were 
better known in the sixteenth century as ''the Devil' s Islands'' - haunted by monsters and 
by spirits which brought evil luck to sailors- than as a possible area for colonization. They 
were, reported William Strachey, who was shipwrecked there in 1609, "feared and avoided 
of all sea travelers alive above any other place in the world.'' 15 Certainly Henry May, a 
11. Anonymous, ''An addition sent home by the last ships from our Colonie in the Bannudas' ', in J. 
H. Lefroy, ed., Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas or Somers Islands, I515-J685, 
Compiled from the Colonial Records and Other Original Sources (2 vols., London: Longman's, Green and Co., 
1877-79), I, 71; Great Britain, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Domestic Conespondence, James I, SP14/ 
68, No.) 62, John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton, 12 February 1612. The term "the Bermudas" has been 
adopted in the title of this essay as an accurnte geographical usage which was favoured also by such seventeenth-
century writers as Silvester Jourdain and Nathaniel Butler. See Jourdain, " A Discovery of the Bermudas, 
Otherwise Called the Isle of Devils", in Louis B. Wright, ed., A Voyage to Virginia in 1609 (Charlottesville, 
Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1964) pp. 103-16; [Butler], The Historye of the Bermudaes or Swnmer Islands, 
ed. J. Henry Lefroy (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1882). Use is also made, however, of two other designations 
which were also current during the seventeenth century: "Bermuda", referring collectively to the islands; and 
"Summer (or Somers) Islands". 
12. Henry Percival Biggar, ed. , The Works of Samuel de Champlain (6 vols., Toronto: The Champlain 
Society, 1922-36), I, 307. 
13. See Virginia Miller, " Aboriginal Micmac Population: A Review of the Evidence", Ethnohistory, 
XXIII, No. 2 (1976): 117-27. 
14. Wilkinson, Adventurers of Bermuda, pp. 19-20. 
15. William Strachey, " A True Reportory of the Wreck and Redemption of Sir Thomas Gates, Knight, 
Upon and From the Islands of the Bermudas .. . ", in Wright, Voyage to Virginia, p. 16. 
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previous shipwreck victim on the Bermudas and the first Englishman publicly to report 
having set foot on the islands, had not been sorry to leave in May 1594, after an enforced 
stay of some five months. For May and his French companions, the first landfall after 
leaving Bermuda was in Acadia, and it brought profound relief: ''We fell with the land 
nere to cape Briton, where we ran into a fresh water river, wherof there be many, and tooke 
in wood, water, and ballast. And here the people of the countrey came unto us, being clothed 
all in furs, with the furred side unto their skins, and brought with them furres of sundry 
sorts to sell, besides great store of wild ducks .... This should seeme to be a very good 
countrey. '' 16 
Between Acadia and the Bermudas, therefore, significant distinctions can be made 
both in physical environment and in human history. Yet early European expectations of 
the two colonies ran parallel to one another, as did the ways in which these expectations 
were brought into question as settlements were established and adjustments had to be made 
to cope with new realities. These similarities provide in themselves an indication of the 
extent to which European expansion into the North Atlantic in the early seventeenth century 
was initially predicated on assumptions that tended to obscure the real differences between 
the opportunities available in the various mainland and island colonies. 
m 
Between the first European visits to Acadia and the Bermudas, and the first serious 
efforts at colonization, there elapsed in each case a period of approximately one hundred 
years. In 1603, a patent was issued by the French crown to Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts, 
for the colonization of Acadia. On this occasion, Acadia was generously defined as ex-
tending from the 40th to the 46th degree oflatitude, but the resources at the disposal of de 
Monts permitted only a small colonizing expedition which set out in 1604 and established 
a settlement on Ste Croix Island. After spending a disastrous winter, during which many 
of the colonists succumbed to disease and to the severe cold, the survivors re-established 
themselves at Port Royal in peninsular Acadia. There the small colony prospered until its 
sudden abandonment in 1607 as a result of the French government's cancellation of de 
Monts' ten-year monopoly of the Acadian fur trade. Port Royal was resettled some three 
years later by one of de Monts' former lieutenants, Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt, and 
by Poutrincourt's son, Charles de Biencourt. From this time forward, the French presence 
in Acadia was continuous, and yet the colony faced formidable problems in finding an 
economic basis on which to attract investment. Quarrels between Biencourt and the Jesuit 
missionaries who had come to Acadia in 1611 were frequent and damaging. The greatest 
disaster, however, came in 1613, when an English raiding party under the command of 
the Virginia sea captain Samuel Argall destroyed not only the Jesuit mission near Mount 
Desert Island but also Port Royal itself. Biencourt, who had by now effectively taken over 
leadership of the colony from his father, was not in the settlement at the time, and with a 
handful of other colonists he remained in Acadia, supported meagerly by the fur trade and 
the fishery. By 1618, he had moved his headquarters to the southern part of the Acadian 
16. Heruy May, "A briefe note of a voyage to the East Indies ... ", in Richard Halduyt, The Principal 
Navigations Voyages Traf!UJues and Discoveries of the English Nation (Re-edition in 8 vols., London and Toronto: 
J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1927), Vll, 164; for more detailed discussion of May and his comments, see John 
G. Reid, ''Heruy May: An Early English Admirer of the Maritime l..adnscape,'' in Peter Thomas, ed., The Red 
Jeep and Other Landscapes: A Collection in Honour of Douglas Lochhead (Sackville and Fredericton, N .B.: 
Mount Allison University and Goose Lane Editions, [ 1987]), pp. 15-19. 
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peninsula in order to exploit the fishing grounds off the coast of that area. On the death of 
Biencourt in 1623, command passed to another of the colonists, Charles de Saint-Etienne 
de Ia Tour. With only a small group of followers, and still occasionally harassed by English 
raiders from further south, La Tour for the time being maintained only precariously the 
French foothold in Acadia. 17 
1be English colonization of the Bermudas, meanwhile, had enjoyed greater success, 
despite having an accidental beginning. Of the nine vessels comprising the Virginia fleet 
which left the English port of Plymouth on 2 June 1609, all but one eventually reached 
the small Jamestown settlement in the late summer. 1be remaining ship, the Sea Adventure 
-carrying not only the fleet commander Sir George Somers, who had been one of the 
original members of the Virginia Company, but also the newly-appointed lieutenant-
governor of the colony, sir Thomas Gates- had been wrecked in July on the coast of 
Bermuda. The 150 colonists and sailors on board, including men, women and children, 
had been safely brought to shore, and stayed on the main island of Bermuda for almost 
ten months until two pinnaces could be built to take the party on to Virginia, where they 
arrived in May 1610. Jamestown was by now in a state of famine, and the governor Thomas 
West, Lord De La Warr, impressed by Somers' reports of the abundant resources offish, 
fowl and wild pigs in Bermuda, dispatched Somers on a food-gathering return voyage, in 
company with Samuel Argall. The voyage was not successful although Argall, who was 
prevented by bad weather from reaching Bermuda, eventually returned with supplies of 
fish and seal meat from the mainland coast further north. Somers had reached Bermuda 
but died shortly afterwards, whereupon his ship returned to England. 18 
Bermuda, however, was not forgotten by the Virginia Company, and on 25 June 
1611 the company's Court took an important decision: ''the State and hope of the Bermodes 
was there fully dyscust", reported a contemporary newsletter, "And Concluded to send 
a Collony thither, the place is so opulent fertile and pleasant that all men were willing to 
go thither. " 19 Accordingly, in the following year the company obtained a new charter, 
which extended the offshore boundaries of Virginia so as to include the Bermudas, and a 
group of some sixty settlers was sent to the islands under the command of Richard Moore, 
designated governor for the first three years. 20 There followed a period of rapid population 
growth, and in 1615 a separate company was chartered "for the Plantation of the Summer 
Islands'', although with a membership composed almost exclusively of persons who were 
also members of the VirginiaCompany. 21 By 1624, the Bermuda Company and its colony 
were sufficiently strong to survive even the crisis which resulted in the dissolution of the 
Virginia Company in that year. For most of the intervening period, the population of 
Bermuda had exceeded that of Virginia, and a Bermuda petition of 1622 estimated the 
17. The events summarized in this paragraph are discussed at greater length in Reid, Acadia, Maine, 
and New Scotland, pp. 14-19,29-30. 
18 . Wilkinson, Adventurers of Bermuda, pp. 43-52; Quinn, North America from Earliest Discovery 
to First Settlements, pp. 454-8. On Somers' return to Bermuda, see PRO, Colonial Papers, COI/I, No. 21 , Sir 
George Somers toLooiSalisbwy, 15 June 1610;andibid., No. 22, Thomas West, Lord De La Warr, toSalisbwy, 
[1610]. 
19. David B. Quinn, ed., "Advice for Investors in Virginia, Bermuda, and Newfoundland, 161 I " , 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, XXIII (January 1966): 144. 
20. Wilkinson, Adventurers of Bermuda, pp. 57-8. For a full interpretation of the kindling of the Virginia 
Company's interest in Bermuda, see Craven, " Introduction", especially XVII (Aprill937), pp. 186-94. 
21. PRO, Colonial Entry Books, 0038/1 , Bermuda Charter, 29 June 1615; Craven, " lntnx:luction", 
XVII (Aprill937), p. 195. 
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number of residents as being ''not fewer than fifteene hundred soules. '' 22 This was not to 
say that the colony's rapid peopling implied that harmony and prosperity had universally 
prevailed. On the contrary, damaging internal quarrels had taken place both within the 
company and within the colony itself. Also, the laying of a sound economic foundation 
had proved difficult, with several potential export commodities having failed to yield ex-
pected returns. Nevertheless, the reputation of the former "Devil's Islands" had per-
manently been changed. As the author of an anonymous tract had remarked in 1610, "all 
the Fairies of the rocks were but flocks of birds, and all the Divels that haunted the woods, 
were but heads of swine.' ' 23 
Birds and hogs were preferable to fairies and devils, not least because they provided 
sources of food. So too did the wildlife of Acadia, with which the French colonists rapidly 
became familiar under the tutelage of their Micmac guides. Yet food resources alone were 
not sufficient to establish colonies on the scale envisaged in both Acadia and the Bermudas. 
The patent granted to de Monts by the French crown in 1603 provided explicitly that one 
hundred French colonists should be sent out annually to Acadia. Although this figure was 
subsequently reduced to sixty, the intention that the colony should be rapidly peopled was 
evident. The Bermuda charter of 1615 revealed a similar intention in making provision for 
the division of three-quarters of the land of the islands into eight ''tribes'': land divisions, 
each to be subdivided into fifty shares. With the remaining quarter of the land to be retained 
by the company in order to yield profits for the offsetting of administrative expenses, the 
entire area of the islands was intended for settlement. Thus, both colonies were envisaged 
not merely as trading ventures but as enterprises involving extensive settlement. Trade, 
however, was specified in each case as a fundamental support for colonization, and both 
charters conferred trade monopolies as well as providing for exemptions from customs 
duties. The commercial provisions of the two documents were not identical, either in the 
concessions granted or in the financial structure within which trade was to take place: 
whereas the Bermuda Company was a joint-stock company, the grant to de Monts was a 
personal one, on the basis of which he subsequently set out to recruit investors. The in-
terdependence of trade and colonization, however, and the expectation that the two would 
be compatible, were basic principles in each case. 24 
As was true of many seventeenth-century colonizing attempts across the North At-
lantic, the reconciliation of the respective demands of trade and colonization proved to be 
no easy task in either Acadia or Bermuda. One difficulty lay in the tendency to underestimate 
the costs of colonization. Transportation of potential colonists, and provision for their 
subsistence during an initial period, were expenses that apparently were predictable. Just 
as de Monts had been well aware in 1605 that only the arrival of "secours ... [et] re-
fraichissemens'' from France, along with reinforcements, could enable his party of colonists 
to remain in Acadia, so the Virginia Company in 1612, having sent "sundrye necessarye 
provisions and 50 persons or thereabouts'' to Bermuda, made clear to Governor Moore 
22. [Butler], Historye of the Bennudaes, p. 294. 
23. Lefroy, Memorials, I, 13. 
24. France, Archives Nationales, Archives des Colonies (hereafter AC), C11D, I, ff. 17-26, Royal 
letter, articles, and remonstrances of de Monts, 1603; PRO, Colonial Entry Books, C038/1, Bermuda Charter, 
29 June 1615. For further analysis of the commercial provisions of the Acadia and Bermuda patents, see H. P. 
Biggar, The Early Trading Companies if New France: A Contribution to the History ofConunerce and Discovery 
in North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Library, 1901), pp. 51-66; and Charles M. Andrews, The 
Colonial Period of American History (4 vols., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934-38), I, 236-7. 
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that supply shipments would "from tyme to tyme be sent from hence for your Releife". 25 
When the need for such assistance persisted over a period of years, however, unexpectedly 
heavy demands were inevitably put upon European investors. In 1620, the Bermuda resident 
John Dutton complained to the Earl of Warwick, a member of both the Bermuda Company 
and the Virginia Company, that the islands were short of basic supplies such as clothing, 
canvas, and soap, and indicated that the Bermuda Company's strict enforcement of its 
trading privileges at the expense of island residents was to blame. The complaint of Charles 
de la Tour, writing to Louis XIII of France from Acadia some seven years later, was even 
more extreme: under pressure from competing traders, both French and English, and lacking 
the support of any significant body of investors, La Tour described how he and his few 
colonists had been forced to live off the land and to clothe themselves in the way of the 
Micmac. 26 Thus, the early experiences of both colonies revealed that without costly in-
vestment the ambition to establish a transplanted European society could easily miscarry. 
La Tour's reference to English harassment, moreover, indicated a further source of 
expense which was by its nature unpredictable: the need for fortification and defence. At 
a time when European territorial claims in the Americas were large, ill-defined, and fre-
quently contradictory of one another, raids by competing nationalities were necessarily 
feared in all nascent colonies. In Acadia, as in other mainland colonies, the possibility of 
conflict with native peoples provided another incentive to look to effective defence, but 
it was the possible arrival of hostile Europeans that Champlain had in mind when he ap-
praised the geographical situation of Ste Croix Island in 1604: "de soy elle est en fort bonne 
situation, et n'y a qu'un coste ou elle baisse ... , qui est aise a fortifier, les costes de la terre 
ferme en estans des deux costey esloignees de quelques neuf cens a mille pas. ll y a des 
vaisseaux qui ne pourroyent passer sur la riviere qu'a la mercy du canon d'icelle. " Similar 
thoughts were in the mind of Silvester Jourdain in 1610 when he remarked of the future 
Castle Harbour in Bermuda that ''the coming into it is so narrow and strait between the 
rocks as that it will with small store of munition be fortified and easily defended with all 
advantage the place affords against the forces of the potentest king of Europe." 27 Subsequent 
events were to prove that both observers were well justified in their concerns. For all the 
work of Champlain in fortifying Ste Croix Island, and then fortifying the new settlement 
of Port Royal in the following year, Acadia's inability to withstand the Argall raid of 1613 
brought disaster to the colony. In Bermuda, Governor Richard Moore had set about the 
construction of "eight or nine forts , called the Kings Castle, Charles Fort, Pembrookes 
Fort, Smiths Fort, Pagits Fort, Gates Fort, Warwicks Castle, Saint Katharines Fort, etc., 
mounting in them all the Ordnance he had .. . . " 28 Moore's preparations were made all the 
more urgent in late 1612 and 1613, when Spanish diplomatic protests of the English oc-
cupation of Bermuda implied an obvious threat of invasion. The Virginia Company took 
the threat seriously enough to send in late 1612 "an adviso with thirtie Passengers and good 
provisions, to prepare with all expedition for their defence against the Spaniard, whom 
25. Marc LescarlJot, The History ofNew-France ... , ed. W. L. Grant (3 vols. , Toronto: The Champlain 
Society, 1907-14; first published 1618), II, 527; Bennuda Archives, Bennuda Records (hereafter BR), Vol. A, 
1612-23, Commission of Richard Moore, 27 Apri11612. 
26. Ives, Rich Papers , p. 204, John Dutton to Robert Rich , Earl of Warwick, 17 October 1620; Uni-
versite de Moncton, Centred'etudes acadiennes, Fonds ReneBaudry, 20. 6-17, La Tour to Louis XIII, 25 July 
1627. See also Craven, "Introduction'', XVll (April1937) , p. 192. 
27. Biggar, Works of Champlain , I, 271 ; Jourdain, " Discovery of the Bennudas", p. 113. 
28. Edward Alber, ed., Capt. John Smith of Willoughby by Alford, lincolnshire; President ofVirginia, 
and Admiral of New England: Works, 1608-1613 (2 vols., Westminster: Archibald Constable and Co., 1895), 
II, 644. 
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they understood ere long would visit them. " 29 A contemporary observer in the following 
year reported that the residents of Bermuda were ''nothing dismayed'' at the threat, and 
when two Spanish ships finally did approach Bermuda in March 1614 they were easily 
dissuaded from attacking. ''Findeing the ordinance to speake more loud and hotly than they 
expected ... '', reported Nathaniel Butler in his history of the Bermudas written shortly af-
terwards, "they presently retraicted ... and tooke their leave" after only two shots had been 
fired. 30 Yet despite this anti-climactic ending, the skirmish proved anew what the experience 
of other North American colonies had already established: that effective defence, with all 
its attendant costs, was a necessity. 
IV 
Experience showed, therefore, that colonization involved large and often unpre-
dictable expenses, which were capable of upsetting the delicate balance between 
commercial and colonial expectations. Given that large-scale state involvement in American 
colonization was not forthcoming in either England or France during the period prior to 
1624, a limited range of options was open to investors and colonists. In both Acadia and 
the Bermudas, three possible solutions were seriously advanced. The first was a simple 
one, inferred from the Spanish experience in central and South America. If mines of pre-
cious metals could be found, c;omparable with those of Mexico and Peru, the expenses of 
colonization obviously would be insignificant compared to the profits gained by investors 
and colonial residents alike. The descriptions of Acadia in the works of Champlain give 
ample evidence of the search for such wealth, in Champlain's repeated reports of silver 
mines, along with mines of lesser metals such as copper. Even Marc Lescarbot, the French 
lawyer and author who visited Acadia in 1606-07 and who was more sceptical than 
Champlain regarding the finding of precious metals, speculated that the Acadian copper-
mines might also yield gold, and noted that he himself had several times seen "des petits 
rochers couverts de Diamans y attaches. " 31 William Strachey, in his report of Bermuda 
based on his enforced stay in 1609-10, was hard pressed to find solid evidence of precious 
metals, but nevertheless found one significant clue: "I never saw ... any venomous thing 
... ", he wrote, "or any creeping beast hurtful, only some spiders, which, as many affirm, 
are signs of great store of gold. " 32 Scarcely more convincing were traditions that buried 
Spanish gold might be found, and yet Richard Moore as governor was sufficiently intrigued 
shortly after his arrival in 1612 to interrogate three island residents as to whether they had 
found any "Treasure". 33 They had not. Nor, despite the confident reports of Silvester 
Jourdain and others of the "great store of pearl" to be found in oyster beds generously 
distributed around the Bermudian coasts, did pearl fishing yield commercially significant 
results. 34 Within only a few years, it was evident in both Acadia and the Bermudas that 
instantly-acquired wealth in the form of precious commodities was not to be expected. 
Hopes might persist, but conviction was lacking. When the Bermuda Company in 1616 
29. Ibid., p. 645. 
30. PRO, Domestic Correspondence, James I, SP14174, No. 89, John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley 
Carleton, 27 October 1613; [Butler], Historye of the Bermudaes, pp. 30-1. See also Wilkinson, Adventurers of 
Bermuda, pp. 62-7. 
31. Biggar, Works of Champlain, I. 181-3, 246-8; Lescarbot, History of New France, II, 503-4. 
32. Strachey, "True Reportory", p. 23. 
33. Arber, WorksofSmith, II, 642. 
34. Jourdain, ''Discovery of the Bermudaes'', p. 112; see also Wilkinson, Adventurers of Bermuda, 
pp. 68-9. 
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instructed its new governor, Daniel Tucker, to ''use all your best meanes ... to discover 
what likelyehood there is of mynneralls'', it went on to explain that it had no intention of 
incurring any "greate charge from hence to sett upon that buisness without some good 
encouragement." Similarly, the Jesuit Pierre Biard, writing of Acadia in the same year, 
suggested cautiously that "si le pays estoit habite, il pourroit approfiter ses mines", but 
warned also that "il faut ... ne.point estre ou avare, ou impatient, qu'on veuille, comme 
les usuriers, aussi tost le profit que le prest. '' 35 
In the absence of mineral wealth on the pattern of central and South America, a further 
possibility was to cover the expenses of colonization on the basis of trade involving not 
precious commodities such as gold and silver, but other colonial products. In Acadia, fish 
and furs were two commodities for which there was a proven European market. In view 
of the rise in the price of beaver skins which had been under way since the early 1580s, 
it was not surprising that the fur trading monopoly of de Monts was seen, in the absence 
of precious metals, as the chief economic support of the colony. After the revocation of 
the monopoly and the subsequent resettlement of Acadia by the Poutrincourt-Biencourt 
expeditions, the fishery assumed increasing importance; following the Argall raid of 1613, 
Biencourt' s colonists survived largely through the dry cod fishery, trading their products 
to La Rochelle merchants. 36 For the Bermuda colony, the natural product which initially 
seemed the most promising for trade was ambergris, a resinous substance originating as 
a biliary product of the whale, which was used in the production of perfumes. The presence 
of ambergris on Bermudian beaches was reported by early observers such as Jourdain, and 
optimistic reports of its quantity soon reached London. "From the Bermudas or Som-
merylands," wrote the London scholar John Chamberlain in 1613 to his friend Sir Dudley 
Carleton, English ambassador in Venice, "there hath come great store of amber-greece 
this yeare, which is the only commoditie they have there as yet, but they hope for more 
hereafter of many kindes though nothing so rich, and begin to nestle and plant there very 
handsomely. " 37 Yet the supply of ambergris proved not to be as abundant as initially hoped, 
or at least not as easily renewable as the Bermuda Company believed when it informed 
Governor Tucker in 1616 that '' Ambergreece upon the shore ... is driven up by every storme 
where the winde bloweth .. .. '' 38 More productive at this time was the sending to Bermuda 
by the company of "Mr. Tickner a skilful planter and curer of tobacco," who was charged 
to give instruction to the colonists in order to "affect that comoditie to the benefitt of us 
the adventurers and you the planters. " 39 Four years later, the cultivation and export of 
tobacco had grown in importance to such an extent that the Virginia Company was able 
to declare (convincingly although disingenuously, in the context of a customs dispute) that 
''the Somers Islands . . . [have] no means to subsiste but merely by the vent of their 
tobacco. " 40 
35. BR, Vol. A, 1612-23, Conunission of Daniel Tucker, 15 February 1616; Pierre Biard, Relation 
de Ia Nouvelle France de ses terres, nature[ du pais, et de ses habitations (Lyons: Louis Muguet, 1616), pp. 32, 
304. 
36. See Robert Le Blant, ''L'avitaillement du Port-Royal d' Acadie par Charles de Biencourt et les 
marchands rochelais, 1615-1618", Revue d' histoire des colonies, XLIV (1959): 138-64. 
37. PRO, Domestic Correspondence, James I, SPI4n4, No. 89, John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley 
Carleton, 27 October 1613. Chamberlain went on to report that one piece of ambergris had been found that was 
''as bigge as the body of a giant and answerable or resembling almost in all points saving for the want of the head 
and one arme"; however, the piece had been broken into smaller pieces by mishandling. 
38. BR, Vol. A, 1612-23, Conunission of Daniel Tucker, 15 February 1616. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Quoted in Wilkinson, Adventurers of Bermuda, p. 152. 
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Yet trade, essential as it was, did not in itself offer any guarantee of reconciliation 
of the conflicting demands of commercial profit and colonial development. On the contrary, 
in Acadia and the Bermudas as in other seventeenth-century colonies, trade was often the 
focus of dispute between investors and colonists. For the investors, a quick return on capital 
was essential, and in the case of Acadia the merchants with whom de Monts was dealing 
were in many cases accustomed to the reaping of annual profits from seasonal fishing and 
fur trading voyages to the North American coast. When the expense of colonization became 
evident, support dwindled. "Lesieur de Monts et ses associes," Lescarbot was forced to 
admit in 1607' "etans en pert ... ' c' etoit chose qu' ilsy ne pouvoit faire sans beaucoup de 
difficulre, que d'entretenir une habitation pardela. " 41 The same pressures were soon felt 
in Bermuda, as the instructions given to Richard Moore in 1612 made clear: "wee advise 
and pray you to be as pruident as you may, to send us some fruits of your labors to give 
encouragement to the adventurers, to make the more speedy and better supplie unto you, 
especially of Ambergreece .... ''42 In the event, Moore drew a shrewder conclusion from 
this instruction than the company had intended: realizing that the availability of ambergris 
was a major inducement for the sending of supply shipments by the company, he refused 
to release in late 1612 all of the ambergris collected. By this means, he succeeded in at-
tracting a further supply of provisions and colonists in 1613, but at the same time made 
himself, as described by Captain John Smith, "amongst the Merchants marvelous[ly] 
distastfull, for the detaining so long the Ambergreece .... " 43 Nor was Moore the only 
Bermudian resident who perceived the difference of interest between adventurers and 
colonists with regard to the ambergris trade. Some four years later his successor Daniel 
Tucker issued a proclamation against private trading of ambergris either among island 
residents or with visiting mariners, and the detailed character of the document as well as 
the severity of the promised punishments gave every indication of a flourishing private 
market. 44 
In Acadia, the conflict of interest between merchant and colonizer was shown in the 
case of the de Monts colony not so much in the form of private trading by colonial residents, 
as in competition from those merchants who had been excluded from de Monts' monopoly. 
Not only Dutch traders, but also rival French interests persisted in voyages to the Acadian 
coast, and the unpleasant truth soon became apparent that the lesser expense involved in 
seasonal voyages- as opposed to maintaining a year-round colony- enabled such in-
terlopers to compete with great effect. In those circumstances, monopoly rights had doubtful 
value. Monopoly rights also tended to arouse resentment among those excluded, and thus 
to be liable to pressures for revocation. This was the fate of the monopoly of de Monts, 
cancelled in 1607 following the complaints of rival merchants and of hatters' corporation 
of Paris. 45 A joint attempt by the Bermuda and Virginia companies in 1622 to monopolize 
the entire importation of tobacco to England met a similarly effective series of protests, 
and the scheme soon foundered amid the confusion that led eventually to the dissolution 
of the Virginia Company. 46 While the companies had staunchly maintained that the 
cultivation of tobacco was not envisaged as the only economic base for Virginia or the 
Bermudas, and that other staple commodities would soon be developed, they had been 
41. Lescarbot, History of New France, II, 574. 
42. BR, Vol. A, 1612-23, Commission of Robert Moore, 27 April1612. 
43. Arber, Works of Smith, II, 645. 
44. Lefroy, Memorials, I, 121, Proclamation of Tucker, [c.1616]. 
45. For further discussion, see Reid, Acadia, Maine and New Scotland, p. 18. 
46. See Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, I, 150-64. 
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forced to recognize the commercial importance of tobacco as an export crop. Yet even in 
this recognition, differences of interest readily arose between merchants and colonists, as 
in the case of the grievances presented to James I in 1622 in the name of "the Inhabitants 
of the Somer Islands''. Certain of the adventurers- the petitioners prudently singled out 
those ''of inferior ranke'' rather than the highest officers of the Bermuda Company- were 
alleged to ''lay yearly Impositions upon your poore subjects Tobacco ... under pretense 
of supplying the Islands with necessarie men, and necessarie munition, which yet wee never 
saw effected. " 47 
The basing of colonization upon trade, therefore, was an answer to the basic problem 
of how the expenses of the colonies were to be borne, and one that had obvious attractions 
in the absence of mines of precious metals. It was not a simple answer, however, involving 
as it did a number of significant conflicts of interest. It was not surprising that grievances 
should arise, both on the part of the investors, who demanded a return equivalent to the 
profits they could obtain in purely commercial ventures, and on the part of colonial residents 
who regarded commercial ambitions as exploitative. Certainly Charles de Biencourt re-
vealed the depth of his frustration when he appealed to the town authorities of Paris in 1618 
for help in obtaining financial support for Acadia, and blamed the colony's lack of devel-
opment on the ignorance and the malice of merchants who were not prepared to be patient 
with the special needs of a small colony. In the same year, the Bermuda governor Daniel 
Tucker complained similarly of the ''many Covetous Adventurers that rather with gree-
diness Desire their instant gaine, than with noble mindes to consider the infancy of the 
business." Tucker's successor, Nathaniel Butler, found himself "delivered up to a world 
of confusion,'' and blamed the Bermuda Company for many of the shortages that existed: 
only through proper support, he warned the company member Sir Nathaniel Rich, could 
the colony flourish. Yet underlying the grievances on either side were the deeper questions 
of whether conflict of interest between colonizer and merchant could be overcome, and 
whether trade in such commodities as fish, furs, ambergris, or tobacco could ever generate 
sufficient wealth to support the establishment of colonial communities. The standard 
complaint about French colonies in North America, wrote Biencourt, was that "on n'en 
voit aucun fruict.'' It was easy enough, he pointedly continued, "de parler entre oisifs ou 
assis dans une chaise.'' For Biencourt, one indication of the potential success of colonization 
was the way in which the English colonies of Virginia and Bermuda were rapidly being 
populated. As regards Bermuda, however, the investor George Carew took a very different 
view: "what will be the successe of that plantation", he wrote in early 1617, "is muche 
to be feared, for my particular I am hopelesse of any proffitt from thence. " 48 Support of 
colonization through trade was still a questionable principle. 
A third answer to the problem of reconciling the interests of trade and colonization 
lay in the development of food production through agriculture. If the colonial population 
could be made self-sufficient in all essential commodities, trade could then proceed without 
the burden of providing supply shipments, and the colonial residents in tum would prosper 
47 . Lefroy, Memorials, I, 275-6, Grievances of inhabitants, [1622]. 
48. Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, memoires, et autres documents historiques relntifs a 
In Nouvelle-France recueillis aux Archives de Ia province de Quebec ou copies a l' etranger (4 vols., Quebec: 
hnprimerie A. Core et Compagnie, 1883-85), I, 57-9, Biencourt to town authorities of Paris, I September 1618; 
Ives, Rich Papers, p. 97, Daniel Tucker to Sir Nathaniel Rich, 10 March 1618; ibid., pp. 193-4, 227, Nathaniel 
Butler to Sir Nathaniel Rich, 23 October 1620, 12 January 1621; Lefroy, Memorials, I, 126, George Carew to 
SirThomasRoe, 18January 1617. 
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through their own industrious cultivation of the land. As early as 1612, the Virginia 
Company showed itself well aware of this approach to colonization, in its instructions to 
Richard Moore in Bennuda. "We .. . give you an especiall charge", the instructions read, 
''to have a dilligent eye and Care to cause the ground to be fitted in due and seasonable 
tyme for the settinge and sowinge of Come, and other provisions for the releife of your 
companie to free us from the Care and Charge of Continuall supplies from hence the neglect 
whereof hath beene a great rnayme and scandall to manye other worthie accons heretofore 
undertaken in this nature. " 49 With that sentiment, Marc Lescarbot agreed entirely. For him 
the unsuccessful sixteenth-century French attempts in Florida gave a prime example of 
failure to attach proper importance to agriculture, for the colonists there had experienced 
famine conditions despite a favorable climate. 'The Florida colonizers had had, Lescarbot 
continued, '' le grande faute de leur part de n' a voir nullement cultive Ia terre, laquelle ils 
avoient trouvee decouverte: ce qui est un prealable de faire avant toute chose a qui veut 
s' aller habituer si loin de secours. Mais les Fram;ois, et preque toutes les nations du jourd 'hui 
(j'enten de ceux qui ne sont nais au labourage) ont cette mauvaise nature qu'ils estiment 
deroger beaucoup a leur qualire de s 'addonner a Ia culture de Ia terre, qui neantmoins est 
a peu pres la seule vacation ou reside I' innocence. " 50 
Lescarbot's comments found an echo in the observation of John Smith that at least 
one early shipment of colonists to Bennuda contained ''many Gentlemen ... [who were] 
very unproper for what they undertooke''; and yet the process of attaining any degree of 
self-sufficiency was in reality more difficult and complex than Lescarbot implied. 51 In 
Bennuda, as Smith explained, the necessity to work on such common tasks as the 
construction of defensive fortifications tended in the early years to draw effort away from 
agriculture, causing "famine and misery". 52 Furthennore, insofar as the commercial 
profitability of the islands was tied to the production of cash crops, an obvious difficulty 
existed in the division of available land between those crops and the production of food 
for local consumption. Smith, by 1624, was sceptical as to whether tobacco, any more than 
pearls or ambergris, could ever produce any significant profit in Bennuda. All of the other 
possibilities he suggested, however, involved agricultural cultivation in some fonn: "by 
Silke, Saffron, Iodico, Madar, Sugar-canes, Wine, Oile, and such like, great profit may 
be expected. " 53 Whether the production of these commodities could ever coexist, on a 
group of islands of the size of the Bennudas, with substantial food production, was a 
question that remained to be answered. In Acadia, meanwhile, one possible answer had 
been put forward by the missionary Biard. For him, colonization could best be approached 
by inducing wealthy patrons to subsidize settlement in order that religious conversions of 
native peoples could proceed. Small agricultural communities of French settlers would thus 
be established independently of the demands of merchant investors, and only later might 
trade be added to the colonial economy. Yet even Biard, with his customary realism, refused 
to assert that such a scheme could ever enjoy quick or easy success. ''ll y faudra tousjours 
despenser les premieres annees," he warned, "justques a ce que Ia terre suffisamment 
49. BR, Vol. A, 1612-23, Commission of Richard Moore, 27 April1612. 
50. L.escarbot, History of New France , II, 529. See also Marguerite Maillet, "Acadian Literature: 
Bibliography", in Jean Daigle, ed., The Acadians of the Maritimes: Thematic Studies (Moncton: Centre d'erudes 
acadiennes, 1982), esp. pp. 513-4. 
51. Arber, Works of Smith , II, 646. 
52. Ibid., pp. 646-7 . 
53. Ibid. , p. 632. On agriculture in early Bermuda, see also Craven, " Introduction", XVII (July 1937), 
p. 329. 
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cultivee, les artifices introduicts, et les mesnages accol110des, le corps de la colonie ait prins 
une juste accroissance, et fermere: eta cela faut se resoudre. " 54 
v 
Acadia and the Bermudas, therefore faced a series of problems as commercial and 
colonial enterprises that were common to both. At the same time, the significant differences 
between the two colonies that were already emerging by 1624 should not be underestimated. 
The colony of Acadia by the 1620s had shown little sign of ever being able to meet the 
high expectations with which de Monts, Champlain, Poutrincourt, and others, had begun 
in the first decade of the century. Trade in fish and furs with La Rochelle merchants had 
enabled the colonists led by Biencourt and La Tour to remain in peninsular Acadia, but 
only in small numbers and surviving by the narrowest of margins. Bermuda, by contrast, 
had suffered during its early years from overcrowding and other difficulties arising from 
a rapidly growing population. The minister Lewis Hughes was inclined to take a moral 
viewpoint: ''the number of people encreasing, and as they encreased, sin and disorder did 
also encrease, which brought the correcting hand of God upon you many wayes, so as divers 
did perish very miserably; but consider, I pray you, that most of them that so dyed were 
ungodly, slothful, and heartlesse men ... . " 55 Whether or not Hughes was right to regard 
this population pressure as a chastisement from which the community emerged streng-
thened, there was no doubt that Bermudian society henceforth showed signs of a complexity 
not yet evident in Acadia. As well as colonists from a variety of social backgrounds who 
came from London, from the counties of Essex and Kent, and to a lesser extent from such 
other parts of England as East Anglia, the first Indian and Black slaves arrived on the islands 
as early as 1616 and thenceforth comprised an increasing proportion of the population. 56 
The calling of the first Bermuda assembly in 1620, and the promulgation by the Bermuda 
Company some two years later of a series of 212laws that served effectively as a constitution 
for the islands, were clear reflections of this growing complexity. That the future of Ber-
muda was widely regarded with optimism was demonstrated by the tone and contents of 
the report of the Privy Council commission set up in 1623 to investigate the condition of 
Virginia and Bermuda in the wake of the damaging factional quarrels which had plagued 
both companies in the preceding years. Although the commissioners worried that there was 
"no Staple commoditie there raysed", except for the small annual tobacco crop, they 
concluded that the Bermudas could expect to prosper under the continuing rule of the 
company. Thus, the Bermuda Company escaped dissolution in 1624, and would survive 
the Virginia Company for some sixty years. 57 
By 1624, therefore, the characters of Acadia and the Bermudas as European colonies 
had begun to differ, and the course of their histories would henceforth diverge. Yet, given 
the original differences between the two in terms of physical environment and of human 
54. Biard, Relation de Ia Nouvelle-France, pp. 102-3. 
55. Wesley Frank Craven, ed., "Lewis Hughes' 'Plaine and True Relation of the Goodness of God 
Towards the Somer Islands'", William and Mary Quarterly, 2nd series, XVII (January 1937): 78-9. On the role 
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Colonies", Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, LXX ( 1960), esp. pp. 164-200. 
56. Wilkinson, Adventurers of Bermuda, pp. 93-1 00; Craven, "Introduction", XVll (July 1937), 
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history prior to colonization, it is not surprising that that should be so. What is more re-
markable is that European expectations of the two colonies should so often have run parallel 
during the early decades of the seventeenth century, and that common difficulties should 
have thus emerged. The expansion of northern European nations into the North Atlantic 
lands through a process of colonization was a new phenomenon at this time. The as-
sumptions that governed European expectations were as yet largely untested, and tended 
to be generalized regardless of what local conditions in individual colonies might turn out 
to be. The applicability of the Spanish example from central and South America to more 
northerly colonies, with the implied aim of discovering mineral wealth, was one such as-
sumed principle. Also assumed was the interchangeability of the concepts of climate and 
latitude. That Acadia should be able to support colonists with much the same material 
culture as their compatriots in central France, and pursuing agriculture in a similar way, 
was one apparently logical expectation that was confounded by the realities of North 
American climate. Similarly, the latitude of Bermuda suggested not only the possibility 
of finding pearls, but also the hope of providing commodities such as wine, silk, and olive 
oil, which were customarily imported to England from southern Europe. Confusion over 
climate differences between Europe and the Americas thus led to unrealistic expectations 
in both colonies. 58 What was not assumed, moreover, was any fundamental differentiation 
between island and continental colonies. While colonial promoters were not unaware of 
the eventual possibilities for extending European influence over large mainland areas, 
colonial expeditions in the North Atlantic territories during the early seventeenth century 
were small in scale and established settlements that were small in area. Several such ex-
peditions chose to establish their settlements on islands for defensive purposes, even when 
mainland sites were available, the choice of Ste Croix island in Acadia in 1604 being one 
example. Even when mainland settlements were set up, they were- at least initially-
islands in what was perceived by Europeans as a wilderness. In terms of settled area, if 
not in terms of territories claimed, a mainland colony such as Acadia was fully comparable 
with an island colony such as Bermuda. 
In the context of these assumptions and perceptions, the comparability of certain 
aspects of the development of Acadia and Bermuda becomes more understandable. Even 
so, the existence of a time period within which these two colonies can be so closely 
compared might seem remarkable considering the dissimilarities that were evident both 
before and after the early decades of the seventeenth century. The phenomenon is less re-
marl<able, though still significant, when considered as part of the transitional period of early 
colonization. Prior to the establishment of a firm social and economic basis for colonization, 
the interaction of colonists with the human and physical environment was dominated by 
a maelstrom of unanswered questions which led in turn to unfulfilled expectations and the 
constant possibility of failure. In the historiography of those colonies which conspicuously 
did not fail, but instead were ultimately able to gather large settled populations, there is a 
natural tendency to ignore early struggles as having only a marginal relevance to later 
development. For colonies such as Acadia and the Bermudas, which did not attain such 
comparatively large populations and which continued to encounter periods of instability 
in their development, the historiographical integration of the early period of adjustment 
and transition can more readily be accomplished. Their experience, however, was not 
initially atypical. For a brief time, differences in economic and environmental potential 
58. See Karen Ordahl Kuppennan, ''The Puzzle of the American Climate in the Early Colonial Period'', 
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between the various North Atlantic territories were obscured by prevailing assumptions 
and by the common effort to reconcile the fundamental conflict between commercial and 
colonial aims. Soon, the testing of assumptions through practical experience, and the di-
versification of the North Atlantic economy would allow the real complexities and variations 
to be more fully understood. Yet during the exceptional period of early colonization, even 
such diverse colonies as Acadia and the Bermudas might show fleeting but genuine si-
milarities of experience. These similarities, in turn, provide evidence of the more general 
struggles of northern European colonizers in the face of realities they could not yet 
comprehend, much less control or change. 
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